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The article explores important 
changes in the EU energy structure and 
legislation. The authors examine the main 
stages of the creation of a common energy 
market in the EU. They analyse recent ac-
tions taken by the European Commission 
and the Court of Justice of the EU against 
its member states and energy monopolists 
who directly or indirectly breach the rules 
of competition in the energy sector. The 
authors come to the conclusion that liber-
alization of the European energy sector 
will eventually have serious theoretical 
and practical consequences for the EU, as 
well as third countries, including Russia. 
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Introduction 
 
More than the 60-year long history 
of the European Union, which is going 
through a difficult period now, reveals 
a number of features that are character-
istic of a major player in international 
politics. First of all, it is the EU’s ex-
ceptional resilience, despite different 
crises and numerous predictions of its 
pending demise. Secondly, it is the 
striking ability of the EU to find ways 
out of seemingly hopeless situations, 
the ability which has been proven on 
many different occasions. Thirdly, a 
distinctive feature of the current EU 
policy is patience and flexibility in 
choosing means to achieve its goals 
accompanied by the EU’s determina-
tion and persistence in implementing 
its plans. As a result of this policy, 
whole branches of economy, which 
were earlier bastions of national sover-
eignty, undergo drastic changes over 
short periods of time to the surprise of 
the whole world. It is this transforma-
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tion that the EU energy market has been undergoing during the last 15 years. 
The course and results of this transformation already force many states not 
only to reconsider their energy policy in general and towards the EU in par-
ticular, but also to adopt the EU practices when solving domestic problems. 
This article analyses the legal foundation of the creation of a common 
energy market in the European Union and gives a short description of the 
three stages of its elaboration. Special attention is paid to the means of en-
forcement of energy obligations for the EU member states and companies by 
the European Commission and the EU Court of Justice. We believe that a 
scrupulous study of the EU experience will make it possible for Russian 
companies and the Russian Federation to better understand the logic and ob-
jectives of the EU in the problematic EU-Russia energy dialogue. The 
achievements of the EU in regulating the energy market are indicative of the 
need to reconsider the attitude of both the state and society to national natu-
ral monopolies, as well as legal provisions regulating their work. 
 
Prerequisites and first steps towards a common energy market 
 
Historically, the supply of energy, heat, and gas to consumers was viewed in 
Europe as an obligation of the state, somewhat of a public service, which deter-
mined the predominant character of the energy sector within the European 
economy. Almost all European countries established companies which were 
vertically integrated and often publicly owned. These companies were granted 
the monopoly right to production, transmission and supply of electricity, heat, 
and gas to consumers. In return they had to take on the obligation to ensure con-
tinuous supply (often at different prices for different population groups). 
Researchers identify several reasons why this path of the energy sector 
development was selected by national governments [3, p. 1]: 
1) there used to be a popular belief that, due to its large size, the energy 
sector can only be an object of natural monopoly; all exclusive rights belong 
to energy organisations controlled by the state; 
2) the monopolist — when being granted these exclusive rights — si-
multaneously assumed obligations to provide services of general economic 
interests1, i. e. there was somewhat of an agreement between the government 
and monopolists, who had to provide continuous energy supply to consumers 
across the country; 
3) the governments believed that having only one energy provider 
makes it easier to control both its work and energy prices; 
4) moreover, a mere idea of competition in the energy sphere was per-
ceived as sedition fraught with political risks, because of possible dissatisfaction 
of consumers with unpredictable supply-demand fluctuations, or even energy 
and heat supply crises in case market relations were allowed in this sector. 
                                                     
1 For more information on the concept of “services of general economic interests” in 
the EU law see The Communications of the Commission on services of general in-
terest, COM (2000) 580 final, Brussels 20.9.2000. URL: http://socialpolicy. ucc. 
ie/com2000_0580en01_Communication%20on%20General%20Interests-revised. 
pdf (accessed 15 December 2012). 
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However, since the late 1970s, the existent monopoly model has been 
questioned by economists, legal scholars, politicians, and industrial and con-
sumer organisations. Economists and lawyers believe that the energy sector 
is potentially competitive, thus monopoly can be replaced with competition. 
At the same time, consumer organisations started to pay increased atten-
tion to low efficiency (productivity) of state monopolies. Lack of completion 
and, as a result, lack of alternatives for consumers could hardly increase en-
ergy monopolists’ interest in consumers and in the improvement of the quality 
of services provided. Energy supply to different consumer groups at different 
prices (sometimes established by a directive) resulted in cross-subsidisation 
within the monopoly, when extremely high rates for certain consumers made it 
possible to offer other consumers certain discount rates totally unrelated to the 
cost of energy. All these were a great burden, first of all, for industrial con-
sumers from other branches of the economy, where competition was rather 
tough. Non-transparent and unpredictable energy charges imposed by natural 
monopolies made it difficult for these companies to compete with US and 
Japanese producers. Thus, large businesses also started to support the idea of 
reforming the energy sector. Moreover, the positive experience of energy mar-
ket liberalisation in the USA in the 1970s and the UK in the early 1980s con-
vinced continental Europe that liberalisation can give positive economic re-
sults. The new market model based on competition also became an interesting 
alternative for the development of European energy market. 
The understanding that the European Union needed a common internal 
energy market developed a long time ago — in the late 1980s. Back then, it 
was already clear what characteristics the European energy market should 
have: it should be competitive, common, and flexible (i. e. capable of rapid 
adaptation to changes). This was reflected in numerous working documents 
and the EU legislation2. However, the turning point was a change in the ap-
proach to energy supply to the consumer. The traditional interpretation of 
energy supply as an obligation of the state, crucial for the normal functioning 
of any society, was replaced by a perception of energy as a commodity, al-
though an idiosyncratic one. And being a commodity, it is subject to the laws 
of competition. 
The European Commission started to promote the idea of a common, 
open and competitive energy market in the EU. The EC had to admit that en-
ergy monopolists did not let energy companies from other member states 
into their national market. It resulted in the fragmentation of the market and 
disruption of the basic principles of the functioning of the common EU mar-
ket. As early as the 1990s, the European Commission announced its inten-
tion to include the traditionally monopolised energy markets (electricity and 
gas) dominated by national monopolies into the European market pro-
gramme. At the same time, the unfolding energy market liberalisation rested 
                                                     
2 See, for example, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European economic and social committee and the committee of the 
regions. Making the internal energy market work. Brussels, 15.11.2012, COM (2012) 
663 final, P. 2. URL: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM: 
2012:0663:FIN:EN:PDF (accessed 17 January 2013). 
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on the assumption that it had to be implemented simultaneously throughout 
the European Union. 
However, the European Commission had to take into account the seri-
ousness of the problem. Firstly, national energy markets were fragmented 
not only legally, but also technologically (due to different technical stan-
dards), and infrastructurally (due to the absence of the necessary infrastruc-
ture for transmitting energy from one state to another). Another problem was 
vertically integrated natural monopolies. 
Following the UK and US achievements in the energy sector, these en-
ergy companies gradually realized the possibility and necessity of competi-
tion in energy production (electricity generation and energy resources extrac-
tion) and energy supply to end consumers. 
At the same time, in energy transmission from producers to consumers, 
one can hardly expect any competition, for it is hardly rational to construct 
several parallel transmission lines or pipelines. Thus, a decision was made to 
retain monopoly on energy transmission networks and separate transmission 
from extraction, generation and supply to end consumers. So, the main tasks 
were the splitting of national monopolist companies and the formulation of 
clear rules ensuring an equal and non-discriminating access to energy trans-
mission networks for all producers and all companies involved in retail en-
ergy trade. It had to be done despite scepticism and even resistance of certain 
states, where the energy sector was traditionally monopolised by state com-
panies [2, p. 432—433]. 
Anyway, the process of energy market liberalisation was launched in the 
European Union. It took place in the form of step-by-step adoption of legis-
lative instruments, because the opening of national markets had to be gradual 
in order to solve technological problems as well as legal and political issues. 
Stage one. The process of liberalisation of the EU energy market com-
menced with the adoption of Directive 96/92/EC (the first energy directive3), 
which had to be implemented by the member states in two years. 
At the first stage of liberalisation, the EU economy and society already 
showed prerequisites for widespread competition in the energy sector. Given 
the introduced liberalisation, the focus of attention was on the establishment 
of basic rules of competition among energy producers and suppliers and the 
formulation of their fundamental rights. According to the Commission’s 
proposals, competition limitations are admissible in case their application 
relates to the fulfilment of public obligations of certain companies. The first 
liberalisation stage was carried out under the motto “as much competition as 
possible, as much regulation as necessary” [6, p. 4]. The partial opening of 
markets manifested itself in the freedom of the states to choose which mar-
kets are to be open for competition and when. The only obligatory criterion 
was the requirement that the open market accounted for at least 35 % of the 
annual power consumption by end consumers. This target was to be 
achieved in five years, i. e. by 2003 [2, p. 426]. 
                                                     
3 See Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 De-
cember 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity // Offi-
cial Journal of the European Communities (OJ) №L27/20, 30.01.1997. 
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Another important element of the first energy directive is that it launched 
the process of separating electric energy generation and sales by national 
monopolies from electricity transmission. Some states were reluctant to ac-
cept it. It resulted in the introduction of separate bookkeeping for these op-
erations within vertically integrated companies and the splitting of these 
businesses at the level of management (not yet at the level of ownership). 
However, the foundation was laid. 
The results of the first energy directive were not dramatic, but, neverthe-
less, significant: it ensured lower prices and better service standards. How-
ever, the shortcomings were also evident. 
Since the first directive regulated only the basic principles of a common 
EU energy market, the member states enjoyed significant freedom in shaping 
their national energy legislation. This approach led to the inconsistent and 
uncoordinated implementation of the Directive provisions by the member 
states. As a result, national markets remained defragmented, which ham-
pered the development of competition. After the first energy direction came 
into force in 1996, the Commission realised the need to prevent the devel-
opment of several parallel (national) energy markets. 
Directive 98/30/EC (the first gas directive4) was adopted in June 1998; 
the document came into force on August 8, 1998. The deadline set by the di-
rective for the harmonisation of the national legislation was August 2000. 
The first gas directive contained general rules regulating transmission and 
storage of natural gas, its distribution and consumption. It also addressed the 
organisation and functioning of the gas market, as well as providing access 
to it. However, all these steps were still insufficient for reaching the set 
goals. The main problems were related to ensuring open access to gas pipe-
lines and gas storage. Among other key issues were the regulation of tariffs 
and the degree of market openness among the EU member states. 
However, the adoption of the two directives was the first serious step 
towards liberalisation. 
Stage two. In November 2002, the Second Energy Package5 was adopted. 
The provisions of the document were mainly aimed at ensuring equal access to 
energy networks and at developing a competitive environment. All in all, the 
Second Energy Package contained a large number of provisions related to the 
liberalisation of the energy sector — the rules of further division of business 
activities of natural monopolies, the reduction of their horizontal concentra-
tion, the development of competition in wholesale and retail energy supply, 
the monitoring of energy transmission and distribution networks, and the man-
agement of third party’s access to the energy infrastructure. As to unbundling, 
                                                     
4 See Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 22, 
1998, concerning common rules for the internal in natural gas // Official Journal of 
the European Communities (OJ), No: L204/1, 21/7/1998. 
5 Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 26, 
2003, concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity which was pub-
lished in (2003) O.J. L. 176/37, Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of June 26, 2003, concerning common rules for the internal mar-
ket in natural gas which was published in (2003) O.J. L. 176/57. 
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there were two minimum requirements at this stage: the legal splitting of en-
ergy transmission companies from the ones supplying energy to end consum-
ers and the establishment of a national regulatory authority in each state. 
The Second Energy Package set tighter deadlines for reforms to be com-
pleted — July 1, 2007 for wholesale energy markets and July 1, 2004 for re-
tail markets. 
In 2005, the Commission carried out a comprehensive study of the func-
tioning of the common European energy market. The Commission identified 
the following main problems: 
— persistently excessive monopolisation in the energy sectors of most 
EU member states; 
— lack of liquidity in the markets, which could have ensured a continu-
ous inflow of new incumbents and energy transmission from the territory of 
one state to another; 
— weak integration between energy markets of the member states; 
— lack of transparency; 
— inadequate unbundling of energy networks and supply. 
However, these issues, as well as the achievements on the pathway to-
wards the EU energy market liberalisation allowed the Commission and the 
member states to set more ambitious goals. At the European Council meet-
ing held in March 2007, a programme best known as “20—20—20”6 was 
adopted. The programme is aimed at reducing CO2 emissions by 20 %, in-
creasing the share of renewable sources as part of the overall EU energy mix 
to 20 %, and increasing energy efficiency by 20 %. All of these objectives 
are to be achieved by 2020. 
Stage 3. In the framework of the “20—20—20” programme implementa-
tion, the Commission developed the Third Energy Package (TEP7), which 
came into force in June 2009. At the same time, the Commission submitted 
its proposal to establish the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regula-
tors to the European Parliament and the European Council. It had to become 
                                                     
6 See the Presidency Concousions of March 8—9, 2007. URL: http://register. consilium. 
europa. eu/pdf/en/07/st07/st07224-re01.en07.pdf (accessed 18  December 2012). 
7 TEP consists of two directives and three regulations: Directive 2009/72/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of July,13,2009, concerning common rules 
for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC // Official 
Journal of the European Union (OJ), No: L 211/55, 14/8/2009); Regulation (EC) No 
714/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of July,13,2009 on condi-
tions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repeal-
ing Regulations (EC) No 1228/2003 // Official Journal of the European Union (OJ), 
No: L 211/15, 14/8/2009; Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of July,13,2009, concerning common rules for the internal market in 
natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC // Official Journal of the European 
Union (OJ), No: L 211/55, 14/8/2009; Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of July,13,2009 on conditions for access to the 
natural gas transmission networks and repealing Regulations (EC) No 1775/2005// 
Official Journal of the European Union (OJ), No: L 211/36, 14/8/2009; Regulation 
(EC) No 713/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of July, 13, 2009 
establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators // Official Journal 
of the European Union (OJ), No: L 211/1, 14/8/2009. 
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the first step towards having a common European body regulating of the EU 
energy market. Without such an organization, the proper functioning of the 
energy market would be questionable. 
The TEP aims to further the liberalisation of the EU energy and gas mar-
kets and strengthen the interconnection between national markets in order to 
ensure energy market integration between the EU member states. To achieve 
these goals, the TEP contains a number of new provisions and initiatives: 
— separation of energy supply and energy generation from energy net-
work operation; 
— greater independence of energy market regulating bodies; 
— division of power, the development of cooperation and decision mak-
ing by the National Regulating Agency for Transnational Issues; 
— greater coordination between energy transmission companies for 
more efficient cross-border trade; 
— increased transparency in energy market operations and consumer 
protection; 
— equal access to gas storage facilities and LNG production and supply. 
It should be emphasised that liberalisation of the EU energy sector in the 
framework of the TEP requires application of competition rules. 
It is a necessary condition for the creation of a competitive energy mar-
ket. Competition rules in the energy sector are directly related to the funda-
mental rules and categories of the EU competition law. First of all, they in-
troduce stringent control over direct or indirect state aid, which can make 
competition in the common energy market senseless. 
 
The current status of the EU energy market:  
problems and prospects 
 
Twenty years after the beginning of energy market liberalisation, which 
was initiated by the Commission, significant achievements have been made; 
they relate, first of all, to the adoption and implementation of the TEP provi-
sions. At the same time, the legal status of the common EU market was 
strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty, which, for the first time in the history of 
the European Union, contained a separate article on energy issues (article 
194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union8). 
                                                     
8 Article 194 of the TFEU reads as follows: “In the context of the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market and with regard for the need to preserve and im-
prove the environment, Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity be-
tween Member States, to: (a) ensure the functioning of the energy market; (b) ensure 
security of energy supply in the Union; (c) promote energy efficiency and energy 
saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy; and (d) promote 
the interconnection of energy networks. Without prejudice to the application of other 
provisions of the Treaties, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in ac-
cordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish the measures neces-
sary to achieve the objectives in paragraph 1. Such measures shall be adopted after 
consultation of the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Re-
gions. Such measures shall not affect a Member State’s right to determine the condi-
tions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources 
and the general structure of its energy supply.” For more detail see [1]. 
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The TEP provisions were welcomed by those member states that had 
achieved significant results in liberalising their national energy markets (for 
example, the UK, the Netherlands, etc.). However, such EU member states 
as Germany and France9 criticised the Commission’s liberalisation initia-
tives, especially the requirements for the unbundling of national monopolies. 
Thus, the provisions of the Third Energy Package are still the subject of 
many heated discussions and arguments. 
The success of TEP introduction largely depends on its opportune and 
correct implementation by all EU member states. Most TEP provisions were 
included into the national legislation of the EU member states and came into 
force as early as 2011. However, this area still remains most problem-ridden. 
Firstly, there is still the problem of asymmetric implementation of the 
TEP provisions by the EU member states and, as a result, different degree of 
openness of energy markets of the member states. In general, it explains why 
some member states have achieved more in terms of opening their markets 
for competition than others. 
Secondly, there are issues that are to be resolved in order to achieve the 
set targets by 2020. They include the absence of an all-European controlling 
and regulatory body. A matter of particular concern is the fact that national 
authorities are still unable to solve transboundary problems in the energy 
sector. 
Another problem is the non-competitive behaviour of former monopo-
lists. The point is that the opening of the energy market for competition does 
not mean that the market will immediately become competitive. In effect, 
even in the framework of the on-going liberalisation, former monopolists 
still hold strong positions in the market. This situation may continue for a 
rather long time. At the same time, former monopolists often take advantage 
of their position to prevent the appearance of new incumbents in the market. 
They create obstacles to prevent competitors from accessing network infra-
structure, take advantage of the pricing policy, engage in uncompetitive 
cross-subsidisation, etc. European directives usually contain certain regula-
tion methods to prevent such misconduct. However, the current situation re-
quires interference of the Commission, national authorities and judicial bod-
ies, which are to exert control over the states and companies to ensure the 
fulfilment of their obligations. 
Finally, there is another complication related to the so called “economic 
patriotism”, which is still professed by a number of the EU states. According 
to this concept, economy regulation is usually considered an issue of na-
tional policy. Moreover, network infrastructure is understood as the infra-
structure meant exclusively for internal, rather than European use. The lack 
of cross-border infrastructure, common for the whole Europe, is an objective 
obstacle on the path towards free transmission of different types of energy 
across the borders of the EU member states. 
                                                     
9 Both France and Germany still believe that the consolidation of different activities in 
the field of energy in the framework of one company (the so called “national leader), 
which can be controlled by the state at any time, is always better, also because of the 
strategic, economic, and political significance of these activities for the country. 
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In Russia, the Third Energy Package is largely known for its Third 
Country Clause10, which suggests the introduction of a special procedure for 
transmission system operators, provided these operators or transmission 
networks were purchased or controlled by third country companies. A com-
pany can be refused certification, in case the purchaser has not met the un-
bundling requirement. The following arguments were put forward to justify 
the need for the Third Country Clause: 
— firstly, the EU was concerned about the fact that the success of the 
idea of unbundling can be undermined by the actions of third country com-
panies, which are not subject to the provisions on unbundling and continue 
to work in both energy production, sales and energy network operation. 
Thus, in European companies, the requirement for unbundling may, theoreti-
cally speaking, result in the purchase of European networks by foreign en-
ergy giants. It made the Commission take measures against “non-European” 
companies operating in the EU. 
— secondly, it is lack of reciprocity in opening energy markets. It means 
that, while the European energy market was open for foreign investors, in-
cluding energy producing companies, the markets of most energy exporting 
countries were closed for Europe11. 
Despite the fact that the provisions and requirements of the Third Energy 
package are still the subjects of heated discussions and problems related to 
their implementation and application are still arising, some positive results 
have already been achieved. 
Firstly, energy production and sales have been separated from energy 
transmission infrastructure (transmission lines and pipelines). The activity, 
which was controlled earlier by a single national operator, is now performed 
by a wide range of companies operating not only in the territory of a single 
state, but also across the European Union. 
Secondly, important steps have been made to eliminate barriers and unite 
national markets both legally and technologically. 
Thirdly, the consumer is playing an increasingly active role having been 
granted more rights and opportunities when choosing the energy supplier. Al-
most 14 European energy and gas companies operate in more than one EU 
states. In 20 EU member states, there are more than three major electricity 
suppliers. It allows consumers (including households) to choose among sev-
eral suppliers or change the supplier, since there is an opportunity to choose 
from several options. At the same time, it is expected that the process of 
changing suppliers will accelerate in the EU member states. According to the 
current estimates, EU consumers can already save up to 13 billion euros per 
year if they change suppliers on the basis of the lowest price considerations12. 
                                                     
10 See Directive 2009/72 Art. 11; Directive 2009/73 Art. 11. 
11 See Impact Assessment on the TEP P.28. URL: http://ec.europa.eu/governance/ im-
pact/ia_carried_out/cia_2009_en.htm#tren_ecfin_rtd (accessed 18 January 2013). 
12 See The functioning of retail electricity markets for consumers in the European 
Union, Study on behalf of the European Commission, DG SANCO, 2010. URL: 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_research/market_studies/docs/retail_electri
city_full_study_en. pdf (accessed 18 January  2013). 
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Fourthly, the measures for supporting consumers are supplemented by 
the introduction of new energy saving technologies. Calculations show that 
expenses of domestic consumers can be reduced by up to 13 % and even 
more if energy saving technologies are used [5, p. 2—6]. 
Fifthly, the EU succeeded in ensuring stable energy supply, which is the 
weakest point for the Union as an importer of energy resources. An increase 
in the “liquidity” of wholesale markets within the EU contributed to greater 
security of energy within the EU. Using their system of gas storage, the EU 
member states can help each other by redistributing energy within the Euro-
pean Union. Moreover, the number of countries supplying gas to Europe in-
creased from 14 to 2313 in 2000—2014. 
Taking into account the accumulated positive experience, heads of Euro-
pean states and governments set a strict deadline (until the end of 2014) to 
complete the creation of a common EU energy market. Within this period, 
the states have to implement the existing EU energy legislation and start im-
plementing it in practice, including the observation of the major technologic 
rules adopted in the European Union. 
 
The role of the European Commission  
and the EU Court in creating the common energy market in the EU 
 
The achievement of the set goals will depend on the determination and, 
perhaps, even strictness of the EU when it comes to the issue of states and 
companies fulfilling their obligations and following the rules of competi-
tion. At the moment, the European Commission is investigating as a matter 
of priority the cases against those member states that have not taken into 
account the provisions of the Third Energy Package in their legislation or 
have done it inadequately. Since September 2011, the Commission exam-
ined 19 cases relating to the inopportune implementation of the provisions 
of Directive 2009/72/EC and the same number of cases relating to Direc-
tive 2009/73/EC14). Only 12 of these cases were closed by October 2012. 
As to the others, the investigation procedure still continues. The Commis-
sion aims to ensure strict monitoring of the implementation of the adopted 
                                                     
13 The impact of liberalisation in supply security can be shown through what hap-
pened in the beginning of February 2012, when a reduction in gas imports coincided 
with an extremely cold winter and unprecedentedly high demand for gas and elec-
tricity. Short-term price signals within different gas network nodes, as well as power 
exchange in the western part of the EU made it possible to supply gas to the areas 
where it was needed most and ensure that all existing capacities were put online to 
secure continuous energy supply to the end user. For more detail see: Communica-
tion from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
economic and social committee and the committee of the regions. Making the inter-
nal energy market work. Brussels, 15.11.2012, COM (2012) 663 final P. 5. URL: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0663:FIN:EN: 
PDF (accessed 18 January 2013). 
14 See Table 12 in Staff Working Document entitled Energy Markets in the Euro-
pean Union in 2011 / «SWD 1» part 4. 
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legislation in the EU common energy market and the markets of its mem-
ber states. 
According to the European Commission, creating equal opportunities for 
all market incumbents to use power transmission lines is of major impor-
tance. Otherwise the development of fair competition is impeded [7]. In this 
connection, the European Commission carried out several investigations 
against some energy companies operating in the European Union on the 
grounds of their breaking the EU competition rules. 
A vivid example is the Commission’s investigation into the anti-compe-
tition agreement between E. ON and GFD relating to the supply of natural 
gas transmitted along the MEGAL pipeline15, which was used as a channel 
to transport gas from Russia to France. During the investigation, on July 8, 
2008, the Commission imposed the first fine for an antirust offence in the 
energy sector. It did not only levy a fine of 553 mln euros, but also imposed 
legal obligations on E. ON, which was to facilitate easier access to the Ger-
man gas market. It was done as a response to E. ON misuse of its dominating 
position, namely limiting access to the market, which was a direct infringe-
ment of competition rules16. 
In another case, the Commission addressed the problems related to the 
vertical integration of market operators. The investigation was conducted 
against RWE — a German electric utility company based in Essen, which 
raised prices in comparison with other competitors in May 2007. It compli-
cated the access to the German energy market and to the German gas trans-
mission network17. 
The Commission also initiated an investigation against ENI Sp. A. 
(an Italian oil and gas company) for attempting to force potential competitors 
out of the Italian energy sales market. As a result, ENI relinquished its shares 
in companies that own, exploit, or manage transmission infrastructure (gas 
pipelines, in this case) transporting gas to north Italy from Russia and North-
ern Europe. The Commission imposed legal obligations on ENI and closed 
the case18. 
The Commission holds a strict position when it comes to the policy of 
some EU member states aimed at supporting their national energy giants. So, 
                                                     
15 MEGAL is a pipeline, which was owned by E. ON and GDF (E. ON is a German 
energy and gas company, GDF is a French company, which produces, transmits, and 
sells natural gas throughout the world). 
16 See E. ON/GDF (Case COMP/39.401) Summary of Commission Decision of 8 Ju-
ly 2009. URL: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C: 2009: 
248:0005:0006:EN:PDF (accessed 11 November 2011); Rod Lambert & Christopher 
Reekie (2010). 
17 See RWE gas foreclosure (Case COMP/39402) Commission Decision of 18 March 
2009 URL: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrast/cases/dec_docs/39402/39402_ 576_ 
1.pdf (accessed 11  November 2011); Rod Lambert & Christopher Reekie (2010). 
18 ENI foreclosure (Case COMP 39.315) Commission Decision of 29 September 2010. 
URL: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrast/cases/dec_docs/39315/39315 _3019_9pdf 
(accessed on 11.11.2011); Rod Lambert & Christopher Reekie (2010). 
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for example, the Commission imposed strict conditions when giving permis-
sion to the merger of two French companies — GDF and Suez in 2006.19 
Another example is the investigation launched by the Commission in 
September 2012 against Gazprom, which was suspected of misusing its 
dominating position in a number of national EU markets20. 
The Commission also makes sure that state interference into gas and 
electricity prices is gradually eliminated. Many member states have already 
managed to abandon state regulation of gas and electricity pricing, including 
retail consumption. The Commission also reached an agreement with a num-
ber of states (Romania, Greece, and Portugal) on the gradual abandonment 
of state interference in energy resource pricing. However, most EU member 
states still try to regulate prices in their retail energy market. The Commis-
sion have already launched several investigations against the member states 
setting prices for consumers and whole manufacturing industries. 
In this connection, a vivid example is the decision of the Court of Justice 
of the EU in the Federutility case, which became a precedent. In 
its preliminary ruling requested by an Italian court, it stated that electricity 
price regulation can be justified only in certain strictly limited cases21. The 
parties to dispute were producers and producer alliances operating in the Ital-
ian gas market (Federutility, Assogas, etc.) and AEEG — the body that es-
tablished the so called “reference price” for gas upon the request of the Ital-
ian government. This price had to be used by gas producers and suppliers as 
a benchmark when formulating proposals for some of their clients. The 
claimant demanded the abolition of the most recent pricing decision of the 
defendant, since the time frame of this decision stretched far beyond July 1, 
2007 — the deadline, after which, according to Directive 2003/55 (article 
23 (1) (c)), the natural gas selling prices should be determined solely by the 
supply-demand correlation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The experience in the creation of a common EU energy market makes it 
possible to draw several general economic and legal regulation-related con-
clusions. 
Firstly, it is important that the EU is ready to consider the problem from 
a different perspective, to believe in market regulation methods against the 
background of strict competition rules enforced by the EU authorities. Spe-
                                                     
19 For more detail see Communication from the Commission to the European Par-
liament, the Council, the European economic and social committee and the commit-
tee of the regions. Making the internal energy market work. Brussels, 15.11.2012, 
COM (2012) 663 final P. 9—14. URL: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/  
LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0663:FIN:EN:PDF (accessed 11 November 2011). 
20 See the European Commission Press Release of 04 September, 2012. URL: http:// 
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-937_en.htm (accessed 15 January 2013). 
21 See Case №С-265/08 Federutility and others v Autorita per l’energia elettrica e il 
gas). URL: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-265/08 (acces-
sed 15 January 2013). 
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cial significance is ascribed to the ability of both the state and the society to 
abandon the idea that electricity, gas, and heat supply is an obligation of the 
state, a public service and view energy as a commodity, although, perhaps, 
an idiosyncratic one. In other words, the EU experience questions the very 
existence of natural monopolies in the energy market. 
Secondly, the liberalisation of the energy market in the form of its de-
monopolisation brings to the fore the splitting of energy generation and sales 
where competition is welcome, from energy transmission. Transmission com-
panies, by definition, cannot be many in number and have to be involved only 
in energy transmission. A special role should be (and is) played by the EU 
regulatory authority, which is meant to control the common energy market and 
ensure equal access to transmission networks both for producers and sellers. 
Thirdly, it is important not only to formulate and strictly observe the EU 
completion rules, but also to provide continuous and secure electricity and 
gas supply to consumers. Here, emphasis is placed on decisive measures to 
be taken by the EU institutions, first of all, the European Commission and 
the Court of Justice, which have to act without any regard to individuals or 
the closeness of companies, offending the new legislation, to authorities of 
the member states. 
Fourthly, as demonstrated above, the Third Energy Package, much-criti-
cised in Russia, has its own logic, which is quite hard to defy. First of all, 
one must understand and accept its focus on competition, rejecting any uni-
lateral concessions. This will inevitably be perceived as a discriminating ex-
ception, undermining competition, distorting the market and thus being in-
admissible for the European Union. Russia must understand this logic, if its 
national energy companies want to at least preserve their standing in the al-
ready gigantic common energy market of the EU. 
Finally, it is interesting to follow the adjustment of the EU energy mar-
ket liberalisation experience to Russian conditions, particularly regarding 
natural monopolies. If Russia seriously considers increasing the competi-
tiveness of its economy and abandonment of its raw-material orientation, 
then the country cannot but reform its natural monopolies following the path 
of the rest of the world. It seems to be necessary both for the Russian econ-
omy and Russian consumers. If the results of transformation of the common 
the EU energy market are convincing enough to launch a similar process in 
Russia, or even force the necessary reforms, Russia will have to find words 
of gratitude for the EU, which today is often criticised for its energy policy. 
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